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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRIAN HUNTER
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Appeal No. 20010960-SC

SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY,
Priority No. 15
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF THE EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
HON. A. LYNN PAYNE PRESIDING, DATED OCTOBER 25, 2001

Clark B. Allred #0055
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED,
McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C.
121 West Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
435-789-4908 // FAX 435-789-4918

Daniel S. Sam, #5865
DANIEL S. SAM, P.C.
319 West 100 South, Suite A
Vernal, Utah 84078
435-789-1301 // FAX 435-789-1344

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

PARTIES TO THIS ACTION
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(1), the parties to this action are listed as follows:
Brian Hunter, Plaintiff/Appellant
Sunrise Tide Company, Defendant/Appellee
Sharlene Bensen, Defendant (not a party to this appeal)
RS West Real Estate, Defendant (not a party to this appeal)
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CLERK OF THE COURT
Re:

Hunter v. Sunrise, Supreme Court No. 20010960-SC
Citation of Supplemental Authorities under Utah R. App. P. 24(i).

Dear Clerk of the Court:
Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I am submitting this
letter, along with nine copies hereof, to supplement the authorities of the Brief of Appellant.
Supplemental authority:

Eastmond v. Earl, 912 P.2d 994 (Utah App. 1996)

This authority should be inserted under the Statement of Issues, page I of the Brief of
Appellant, and under the Argument, page 6 of the Brief of Appellant (immediately following the
quoted material from case of Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah 1990)).
The Eastmond case recently came to the attention of Appellant's counsel, and is pertinent
and significant to this appeal because, as with this case, the issue there was whether a codefendant could be served more than 120 days following the filing of the case where another codefendant was served within 120 days.
In the Eastmond ense, one defendant (the "First Defendant") was served on August 13,
1987, within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. The First Defendant thereafter filed
bankruptcy. On February 9, 1992, the other defendant (the "Second Defendant") was served with
the summons and complaint. The trial court in Eastmond granted summary judgment in favor of
the Second Defendant in part because he was not served within 120 days of the filing of the
complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in part because, under Rule 4(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, where one defendant is served within 120 days of the filing of the
complaint, a co-defendant may be served at any time "prior to trial."
Based on the above, the Appellant respectfully requests that the Eastmond case be
supplimented to the Appellant's brief.

Janiel S. Sam
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
DSS/he

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Order of the Eighth Judicial District Court,
Hon. A. Lynn Payne, dated October 25, 2001, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0');
to wit, appeal from a District Court decision dismissing action on motion to dismiss.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW,
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY, AND CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
I

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS UNDER AUTHORITY OF Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b)?

Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss is a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the decision of the trial court.
Krouse v. Bower, 20 P.3d 895 (Utah 2001); Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. EldonJ. Stubbs Construction,
Inc., 714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986); Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah
1990).
The above issue was preserved in the trial court for appeal because it forms the basis
upon which the final order was entered. See Order (T. at 327).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
The interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) is believed to be determinative of this appeal
or of central importance to the appeal. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) reads as follows:
Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the
summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no
later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless the
court allows a longer period time for good cause shown. If the
summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall be
1

dismissed, without prejudice on application of any party or upon
the court's own initiadve. In any action brought against two or
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of
them within die 120 days or such longer period as may be allowed
by the court, the other or odiers may be served or appear at any
time prior to trial.
There are no other constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is believed to be determinative of diis appeal or of central importance to
the appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action which was originally brought by the Plaintiff to recover damages
against Defendant Sunrise and two other defendants where Defendant Sunrise was the closing
agent (tide company) in a real estate transaction handled in July and August 1995, and the
other two defendants were real estate sales agents in the same transaction. Plaintiff owned an
equitable (unrecorded) interest in the real estate involved in the transaction. The transaction
purported to convey tide from die record tide owner to Morgan Glines, who was an officer
and shareholder of Defendant Sunrise. Plaintiff obtained an order in the case of Hunter v.
Glines, in the Eighth District Court of Duchesne County, Roosevelt Department, State of >
Utah, case no. 950000136, filed May 18, 1998 (See this order enclosed herein in the
Addendum), effectively nullifying die transaction and vesting tide in die real estate in the
name of Plaintiff (the Judgment referenced therein, dated November 20,1997, is also enclosed
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Heather T. Eskelson, do hereby certify that 1 mailed first class, postage prepaid, two
true and correct copies of the foregoing letter on this \V C day of April, 2003, to:
Clark B. Allred
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED,
MCCLELLAN & TROTTER
121 West Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
,

,

V Iluiiter.suppaulh.wpd

. >
Heather T. Eskelson, Secretary
J

in the Addendum). Plaintiff then filed this action in July 1998 against Defendant Sunrise and
the other two defendants for damages alleging breach offiduciaryduty, slander of title, fraud,
and/or negligence in the manner in which the sale transaction was conducted by the Defendant
Sunrise and the other two defendants.
n. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
The Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this matter against the Defendant Sunrise, Sharlene
Bensen ("Bensen") and RS West Real Estate ("West") on July 14, 1998, requesting damages
against the defendants arising from the real estate sales transaction held on July 26, 1995. (T.
at 3-10). After having been served with Summonses, Bensen answered the Complaint on
October 29, 1998 (T. at 20) and West answered the Complaint on October 27, 1998 (T. at
11). On June 16, 2000, following a hearing on West's and Bensen's Motions for Summary
Judgment (see Court minutes, T. at 238 and T. at 268), the Plaintiff, Bensen and West entered
a Stipulation and Motion for Order of Dismissal (T. at 285), dismissing the action against
Bensen and West, but specifically reserving the issues as to Defendant Sunrise. On June 26,
2000, the Order, pursuant to the Stipulation and Motion, was entered (T. at 292). This order
specifically reserved the Complaint against Defendant Sunrise and did not constitute a final
judgment as to West and Bensen under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). On May 17, 2001, Plaintiff
filed an Amended Complaint (T. at 308). The Amended Complaint and Summons was served
on Defendant Sunrise on May 18, 2001 (T. at 329). On June 7, 2001, Sunrise filed a Motion
to Dismiss (T. at 279) and a memorandum in support thereof (T. at 281) based on the fact that
3

Sunrise was not served within 120 days of the filing of the original Complaint. Plaintiff filed
a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss on June 13, 2001 (T. at 288) and
Sunrise filed a reply memorandum in support on June 26, 2001 (T. at 294). The Court
initially denied the motion to dismiss by Ruling dated September 17, 2001 (T. at 320).
However, following a Motion to Reconsider, filed by Sunrise on September 19, 2001 (T. at
322), the court, on October 2, 2001, reversed its prior ruling, and entered a Ruling granting
the Motion to Dismiss (T. at 325). The Order on the October 2, 2001, Ruling, constitutes a
final judgment for purposes of appeal, was entered on October 25, 2001 (T. at 327). The
Notice of Appeal in this matter was filed on Monday, November 26, 2001 (T. at 342). The
Stipulation and Motion for Order of Dismissal, filed on June 13, 2000, (T. at 285), the Order
of Dismissal, filed June 26, 2000, (T. at 292), the Ruling dated October 2, 2001, (T. at 325),
and the Order of Dismissal dated October 25, 2001, (T. at 327) are also enclosed in die
Addendum to this Brief.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

The material facts on this appeal for the most part are procedural in nature and are

primarily set forth in the Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below section above
supplemented by the following relevant facts.
2.

Defendants Bensen and West both answered the original complaint within 120

days of the filing of the original complaint (T. at 11, 20, and 328).
3.

The Court only granted a partial summary judgment in favor of West and Bensen.
4

(T. at 268) Certain counts of the Complaint were still outstanding at the time the Plaintiff, West
and Bensen entered into the stipulation (T. at 268 and 285).
4.

The Order of Dismissal regarding the claims against West and Bensen, filed June

26, 2000, (T. at 292), specifically reserved the complaint against Defendant Sunrise and does
not contain an express determination and direction under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Two of the defendants in this action were served and generally appeared within 120 days
of the filing of the original complaint. The case was still pending as to all of the Defendants on
May 18, 2001, the date on which the Defendant Sunrise was served with the summons.
Therefore, the Defendant Sunrise was timely served within the meaning of Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b).
ARGUMENT
I

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS UNDER AUTHORITY OF Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b)?
A.

The Order Erroneously Applies Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b).

The Order (T. at 327-330) erroneously applies Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) in dismissing the
Complaint as to Defendant Sunrise. The last sentence of this Rule states as follows:
In any action brought against two or more defendants on which
service has been obtained upon one of them within the 120 days or
such longer period as may be allowed by the court, the other or
others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial.
In the case of Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah 1990), the Utah
Supreme Court dealt with this issue. In Barber, the Plaintiffs sued the Defendants, a limited
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partnersliip, and general partners, for renewal of a judgment in March 1987. The Plaintiffs
served two of the general partners with summonses, but served them in their individual
capacities and not in their representative capacities as general partners. A third general partner
was not served. The trial court renewed the judgment against the partnership and against the
three general partners on a partial summary judgment. In its ruling on appeal, the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
Appellants challenge the renewal of the judgment because
Don White, one of the general partners, was not served. It is true
that the judgment against White cannot be renewed without proper
service on him. Failure to serve White, however, has no effect on
the renewal of the judgment against the two general partners who
were served. We therefore vacate the renewal of the judgment
against White and against the partnersliip. We note, however, that
service upon these parties can still be attempted. Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(b) provides, "In any action brought against two
or more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one
of them within [the proper time period], the other or others may be
served or appear at any time prior to trial. Because the other
defendants were properly served and the trial court only
granted a partial summary judgment, the Barbers can still try
to serve White and the partnership at any time prior to final
disposition of the case.
Barber, 800 P.2d at 797-798. (Citations omitted, emphasis added).
In the case at hand, the Defendant Sunrise was one of three defendants named in the
original complaint filed in July 1998. The other two defendants, West and Bensen, were
properly and timely served within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. In June 2000,
following a ruling partially granting and partially denying motion for summary judgment filed
by Defendants West and Bensen, the Court entered a ruling based on a stipulated settlement
6

among the Plaintiff, West and Bensen, dismissing the matter against those defendants but leaving
the matter open as to Defendant Sunrise. On May 18,2001, Defendant Sunrise Title was served
with a summons and the amended complaint.
B.

The Court is Bound by the Plain and Unambiguous Language of Utah R.
Civ. P. 4(b).

According to the plain and unambiguous language of the last sentence of Rule 4(b) and
according to the Barber case, Defendant Sunrise has been properly served. The Court's order
dismissing plaintiffs case goes beyond the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 4(b) by
adding unwritten exceptions and qualifications which cannot be gleaned by any reasonable
reading of the rule. It is clear that the appellate courts of this state follow and are bound by the
plain and unambiguous language of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Prowswood, Inc. v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984); Dipoma v. McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225,
426 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah 2001) (stating, "[T]his court has consistently looked to the
plain language of the applicable rule when construing it, thereby declining to read additional
language into the rule."); and Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. EldonJ. Stubbs Construction, Inc., 714
P.2d 1142,1143 (Utah 1986). In the Valley Asphalt case, referring to Rule 4(b), the court stated,
"[I]f the requirements of timely issuance and service are met as to one defendant, the rule clearly
allows other defendants, whether named in the original complaint or brought in by amendment,
to be served any time before trial." Id. Based upon the cases cited, Rule 54(b), and the plain
and unambiguous language of Rule 4(b), it is clear that the Court's Order in this case goes
beyond the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 4(b). Plaintiff is entitled to rely on the
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plain language of the Rules of Civil Procedure. If the Plaintiff cannot rely on the plain language
of the rules because the courts have such broad discretion to interpret the rules as they please,
then it would be impossible to expect the Plaintiff and the public in general to have notice of the
requirements of the rules. Therefore, to the extent that the court dismissed this case on
interpretations and reasoning that goes beyond the plain language of Rule 4(b), the Court has
erred in granting the motion to dismiss.
C.

The Order is Based on Erroneous Assumptions.

The Court in the Order (T. at 327-330) makes several erroneous assumptions which are
the basis for the dismissal of Plaintiff s case.
First, in the Order at paragraph 6 (T. at 229), the court states that, "Rule 4(b) only allows
service later than the 120 days upon a co-defendant when there are issues involving the codefendants which are pending before the court." The Court further states in paragraph 6 of the
Order that, "In this case all co-defendants had been dismissed on June 22,2000." This language,
as a statement of the court's interpretation of Rule 4(b), is based on the erroneous premises that
as of June 26, 2000, there were no triable issues before the Court and that the June 26, 2000,
order acted as a final judgment as to Bensen and West for purposes of Rule 54(b).
In this case, there were issues pending involving a co-defendant on the date Sunrise was ,
served. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) makes it clear that the June 26, 2000, Order had not become a
final judgment, as defined by Rule 54(a), for purposes of appeal. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) states
in pertinent part as follows:

8

Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, and./or when multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by
the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(Emphasis added)
Thus, based on Rule 54(b), it is clear that the case was still open and pending as to all of
the parties on May 18, 2001, the date the Defendant Sunrise was served. Therefore, the Court's
reasoning for dismissing the case by the October 25, 2001, Order (T. at 327) is flawed.
Second, at paragraph 5 of the Order (T. at 328), the Court suggests that the Amended
Complaint (T. at 308) states different causes of action than the original Complaint (T. at 3). In
fact, the first cause of action of the Amended Complaint (fiduciary duty) is the same as the
second cause of action of the original Complaint and the third cause of action of the Amended
Complaint (fraud) is the same as the fourth cause of action of the original Complaint. Thus, the
October 25, 2001, Order is further flawed to the extent that the Court's reasoning for dismissal
of is supported by paragraph 5 of the Order.

9

D.

The Plam Language of Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) is Consistent with Utah R. Civ.
P. 71B(b).

Finally, Utah R. Civ. P. 71B(b) provides as follows:
Proceedings after judgment against parties not originally served.
When a judgment has been recovered against one or more, but not
all, of several persons jointly indebted upon an obligation, the
plaintiff may require any person not originally served with the
summons to appear and show cause why he should not be bound by
the judgment in the same maimer as though he had been originally
served with process.
Rule 71B(b), like Rule 4(b), does not provide any basis for inferring that are unwritten
requirements, like that of requiring that issues should still be pending before the court at the time
the unserved defendants are finally served, like the Court in this case required. In fact, it is
consistent with Rule 4(b), and in fact it is in direct opposition to the Order (T. at 327) of the
Court in this case by clearly authorizing the plaintiff to serve an unserved defendant even if there
is a final judgment obtained against co-defendants who have been served. In essence, even if
there are no triable issues before the Court against a co-defendant, the plaintiff may still bring
an unserved defendant before the Court to answer to the judgment. In light of Rule 71B(b), it
is even more likely that one would rely upon the plain language of Rule 4(b) and do what'the
Plaintiff did in this case, believing that Rule 4(b) authorized later obtaining service of process
upon an unserved defendant.
Based on the Order (T. at 327), it is clear that the Court's intention was to dismiss on the
basis that there was no triable issue pending against a party that was served within the 120 day
period. This basis for dismissal is not only unsupported by any law but goes against the plain
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language of Rule 4(b), against Rule 54(b), against Rule 71B(b), and is contrary to the language
of the Utah Supreme Court in the Barber case. If the Court's Order were allowed to stand, it
will creates a situation where a reasonable person could be fooled by the plain language of Rule
4(b). There is certainly no notice to the public that Rule 4(b) can be interpreted in a manner
other than its plain and unambiguous language which is supported by Rule 71B(b).
CONCLUSION
Based on the case law presented herein and the plain and unambiguous language of Rule
4(b), the District Court clearly erred in granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Plaintiff
is entided to rely upon, and the Courts are bound to follow the plain language of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court's interpretation of Rule 4(b) is contrary to the plain language of
that rule and is based upon erroneous assumptions. Therefore, the Order granting dismissal
is erroneous. Therefore, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the District Court's Order of
Dismissal, dated October 25, 2001, be reversed
Respectfully submitted this /t)

day of May, 2002.

DANIEL S. SAM
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nichole Young, do hereby certify that on May IT) , 2002, I mailed first class,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
Clark B Allred
McKeachnie, Allred, McClellan & Trotter, P.C.
121 West Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Nichole Young, Le^dl Secretary*
z Dunn.app.wpd
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FILED
DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

1/8 1998
J<6ANNEN$KEE, CLERK

.DEPUTY

77

DANIEL S. SAM, #5865
Attorney for Plaintiff
Brian Hunter
319 West 100 South, Suite A
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone (43 5) 789-13 01

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN HUNTER and JANET HUNTER,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER DECLARING SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT AND
VESTING TITLE

vs .
MARY ROWSELL, a single woman,
and C. MORGAN GLINES and
VELLA R. GLINES, husband and
wife,

Civil No. 950 000 136

Defendants.
On the 6th day of February, 1998, the Plaintiff Brian Hunter,
through his attorney, Daniel S. Sam, presented to the Court his
Notice of Satisfaction

of Judgment.

The Court notes that on

November 20, 1997, it entered its Judgment in this matter and that
under paragraph

3 of

the Judgment,

Plaintiff

was

required

to

release Glines of the Zions Bank obligation within sixty (60) days
of the Judgment and that if he did so the real property at issue in
this matter would vest in the name of Plaintiffs.
notes

that

in

an

Order

dated

January
1

14,

The Court also

1998,

it

extended

Plaintiff's time to obtain the release to January 30, 1998, and in
an Order dated January 28, 1998, it again extended the time to
February 3, 1998.

The Court also notes that the Plaintiff, Janet

Hunter, died after the commencement of this matter, but prior to
the trial.

The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff's Notice and its

attached exhibits
evidence

for

finds

the Court

that said Notice presents
to

conclude

that

the

satisfactory

Plaintiff,

Brian

Hunter, did obtain a release of Defendants, Glines, from the Zions
Bank obligation within the time required by the Court and that the
real property in question should now vest in the name of Plaintiff,
Brian Hunter.

In light of the presumption of Section 57-1-5(1) (a) ,

Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, the Court also concludes that
since this matter was filed and prosecuted by the Plaintiffs, Brian
and Janet Hunter, as husband and wife, the property should have
vested in Joint Tenancy if Janet Hunter would have now been living.
NOW, THEREFORE, upon full consideration of the issue, the
Court being fully advised in the premises, hereby Orders that:
1.

The requirement imposed upon Plaintiff, Brian Hunter, by

the Court in paragraphs 2.d. and 3. of its Judgment dated November
20, 1998, to obtain a release of Defendants, C. Morgan Glines and
Vella R. Glines, from the Zions Bank obligation is hereby declared
to be fully satisfied.
2.

The

real

property

in
2

question,

located

in

Duchesne

County, State of Utah, and described as follows, does hereby ve
as of February 3, 1998, in fee simple absolute, in the name
Plaintiff, Brian Hunter:
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, UINTAH SPECIAL BASE &
MERIDIAN
Section 19: Beginning at a point 63 feet South and 382
feet West of the Northeast Corner of the Northeast
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter; thence North 63 feet;
thence West 200 feet; thence South 300 feet; thence
Northeasterly 308 feet, more or less, to the point of
beginning.
A non-exclusive easement to use a right-of-way as granted
by C. Morgan Glines and Vella R. Glines, husband and
wife, to James W. Hoopes, et. , al. , by Agreement recorded
November 12, 1980, as Entry No. 211609 in Book A-77 page
857, records of Duchesne County, Utah; which right-of-way
is described as follows:
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, UINTAH SPECIAL BASE &
MERIDIAN
Section 19: Beginning 330 feet North of the East Quarter
Corner thence Southwest to a point 382 feet West and 30
feet North of said East Quarter Corner; thence West 938
feet; thence South 30 feet; thence East 938 feet; thence
Northeast to a point 30 feet South of the point of
beginning; thence North 30 feet to the point of
beginning.
TOGETHER
with
all
thereunto belonging.

improvements

3

and

appurtenances

SUBJECT to all existing easements and rights-of-way.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas, and mineral rights.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Gaylel\F. McKeachnie
NOTICE
The below referenced parties will PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that,
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
the

undersigned

will

submit

the

foregoing

Order

Declaring

Satisfaction of Judgment and Vesting Title to the Judge of the
Eighth Judicial District Court for signature upon the expiration of
five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for
mailing, unless a written objection is filed with the Court prior
to that time.

Please govern yourself accordingly.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Trisha Hamner, do hereby certify that on the

lp

day of

February, 1998, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order
Declaring Satisfaction of Judgment and Vesting Title, was mailed,
4

postage fully prepaid, faxed, or hand delivered to the following:
Gayle F. McKeachnie, Clark B. Allred, Clark McClellan, McKEACHNIE,
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C., 855 East 200 North (112-10), Roosevelt,
Utah

84066

and

Gayle

F.

McKeachnie/Clark

B.

Allred,

Clark

McClellan, McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C., 121 West Main,
Vernal, Utah

84078.
y

Trisha Hamner, Secretary

may hunter.ord
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FILED

NOV 2 0 1997
JO.
BY-

JEHcMEE. CLERK
.DEPUTY

GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113
McKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants, Glines
855 East 200 North (112-10)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Telephone: (801) 722-3928
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT

BRIAN HUNTER AND JANET HUNTER,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT
vs.
MARY ROWSELL, a single woman, and,
C. MORGAN GLINES AND VELLA R.
GLINES, husband and wife,
Defendants,

Civil No. 950000136
Judge John R. Anderson

The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Claim of Defendants C. Morgan Glines and Vella R.

Glines for unlawful detainer is dismissed.
2.

The warranty deed for the property in question from the

estate of Ladd C. Richman to Mary Rowsell is hereby reformed to a
mortgage upon the following terms:
a.

The date of the mortgage is February 15, 1995.

b.

The mortgage secures a loan made by Mary Rowsell to

Brian and Janet Hunter.
c.

The amount of the loan secured by the mortgage is

$15,000.00, the amount that Mary Rowsell borrowed from Zions First
National Bank.
d.

The obligation secured by the mortgage is to be paid

by Hunter by obtaining the release of C. Morgan and Vella Glines
from

the obligation

the Glines' undertook

to Zions Bank,

the

proceeds of which were used to pay off the loan Mary Rowsell made
to pay off the Richman obligation, and to provide money to Rowsell
for other purposes.
3.

The release of Glines by Hunter must be made within sixty

(60) days of the signing of this judgment.
within sixty

If such action is taken

(60) days, title to the property in question shall

vest in the name of Brian and Janet Hunter.
4.

If

Glines

are

not

obligation within sixty (60)

released

from

their

Zions

Bank

days of the date of this judgment,

Hunter will default in his obligation under the mortgage and shall
have no further claim to the property.
5.

Hunter is awarded damages against Mary Rowsell in the

amount of $1,260.00 for loss of income and $12,230.00 for attorneys
fees .

6,

Except as indicated in paragraph 5 above, the parties

shall be responsible for their own attorneysyf^s and costs,
DATED this

day of November, If

MARK J. WILLIAMS #3494
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
R S West Real Estate
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

"'

i? •
.,, - ^
^
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN HUNTER,
Plaintiff,

) STIPULATION AND MOTION FOR
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL

V.

SHARLENE BENSEN; R S WEST RE AL ]
ESTATE, a Utah real estate agency;
]
SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah lilie ]) Civil No. 980000102CV
insurance agency,
]) Judge: A. Lynn Payne
Defendants.

}

Plaintiff Brian Hunter, by and through his attorney, Daniel S, Sam, and defendant,
Sharlcno Bensen, by and through her attorney, Rand Ilirschi, and defendant, R S West Real
Estate, a Utah corporation, by and througli ils attorney, Mark J, Williams, hereby stipulate and
move the court to enter an order in this mailer dismissing plaintiffs complaint against these
defendants only, with prejudice and upon the merits, said aclion having been fully compromised
and settled against these defendants only, and ordering the parties to bear its own costs. The
plaintiff does not intend to dismiss, and herebyreservesits complaint against the remaining
defendant, Sunrise Title Company.

DATED this 7

day of

l^Ai^r.

A.1

, 2000.

.^/AAA*/}

Daniel S. Sam
Attorney for Plaintiff

DATED this 9^1 j day of

sf/sf/Z^

_, 2000.

Attorney for Defendant Sharlene Benscn
t*

DATED this II "day of.

.,/ "

n<

/>'

_, 2000,
-r'/r,

/ /<^#U-.
Mark J. WiUiams'
Attorney for Defendant RS West Real Estate

...» VA -/m

MARK J. WILLIAMS #3494
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
R S West Real Estate
136 Bast South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

....7f.CiJt«^

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN HUNTER,

)

) ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

v.
SHARLENE BENSEN; R S WEST REAL
ESTATE, a Utah real estate agency;
SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah title
insurance agency,

)
) Civil No. 980000102CV
) J udgc: A. Lynn Payne

Defendants.

Upon reading the Stipulation and Motion for Order of Dismissal, and good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiffs complaint be and the same is hereby
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits against defendants, Sharleno Bensen and RS West
Real Estate only, with prejudice and upon the merits, and that each party shall bear its own costs.
DATED this V~~ day of

1) ' ^ v
BY THE COURT:

,2000.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Daniel S. Sam
Attorney for Plaintiff

Rand I'lirschV"
'At*orney for Defendant Bensen

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ccrti fy that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed via United States
Mail, first class, postage prepaid on the 12/day of .^A.AJU.

, 2000, as follows:

Daniel S. Sam
319 West 100 South, Suite A
Vernal, UT 84078
Mike 1-Iomer
Rand Hirschi
Suitler Axland
175 South West Temple, Seventh Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 34101

'V.""goJUA CV-7J/A
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FILED
DISTRICT COURT
DUCHiSNE COUNTY, UTAH

OCT - 2 2001
BY

JOANNE McKEE, CLERK
r'-C.CK
DEPUTY

In The Eighth Judicial District Court Of Duchesne County
Stare of Utah
BRIAN HUNTER,

|
I

RULING

Plaintiff,

SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant.

,

_ _

|
j
j

CASE NO.980000102

I

On Sept. 13, 2001, the Court entered it's Ruling on the Defendant's (Sunrise Title
Company) Motion to Dismiss. In it's Ruling the Court noted that (he Defendant, had not
replied to the response of Brian Hunter, 'The Defendant lias now filed a Motion to Reconsider
based upon the fact that the Defendant had filed a reply which the Court had not reviewed.
It is obvious that the reply was timely filed and should have been considered by the
Court, Therefore, the Motion to Reconsider is granted. In it's reply the Defendant points to
the fact that all issues relating to the Co-Defendants, (Benson and R.S. West) were fully
resolved prior to service upon Sunrise. Defendant points out that the language of Rule 4(b)
only provides for service on Sunrise beyond 120 days if Sunrise is served prior to trial. The
Defendant's point is well taken. All issues involving the Co-Defendants (Benson and R, S.
West) had been fully resolved prior to service on Sunrise.
Rule 4(b) only allows for service upon a co-defendant beyond 120 days when there arc
issues involving co-defendants which are pending before the Court, Therefore, the Court will

set aside it's Sept. 13, 2001 Ruling and grant Ihe Moiiori to Dismiss.
DATED this

JL day of Oct., 2001.

A. Lynn Payne, lXstrict Court Judge

Mailing Certificate
. ,
1 do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered, on the _£_
day
of Oct., 2001, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to:
Daniel S. Sam
319 West 100 South, Suite A
Vernal, UT S4078
Clark B. All red
72 North 300 Hast (123-14)
Roosevelt, UT SAM

Deputy Court Clerk

EXHIBIT A
FILED
KVR;CT COURT"

DC! 2 J 2:01
.jC'A'-i.'iti !••',;-''-'i:'l. Oi£i'!!\

DY.

-jim.'.ip^DEFUTir

GAYLE F McKEACHNIE - 2200
' ""
CLARK A. McCI.ELLAN - 6113
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLFLLAM & TROTTER, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant, Sunrjse Title Company
121 West Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (435} 789-4908
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT
BRIAN HUNTER,

)

ORDER

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.
SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)

Civil Mo. 980000102
Judge: A. Lynn Payne

The above captioned matter came before the Court, for ruling
on Defendant, Sunrise Title Company's Motion to Reconsider Motion
to Dismiss on Basis that Reply Memorandum had been Filed and
Request for Oral Argument.

The Court previously ruled en the

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and noted that no Reply Memorandum
supporting the Motion to Dismiss had been filed.

The Court afrer

further review of the file determined that a Reply Mei'.'.oranduii; u'i
Support of the Motion to Dismiss had been finely filed and that
it contained argument and .Information important to the Court'L;
consideration of the Motion to Dismiss.

The Court thoruioie

granted the Motion to Reconsider, reviewed the pleadings and the
memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss and the Court entered its Ruling on October 2, 2001.
Based thereon the Court finds and orders as follows:
1.

Plaintiff filed this action on July 1<1, 1998 naming as

Defendants, Sharlene Benson, R.S, West Real Estate and Sunrise
Title Company.
2.

Defendants Sharlene Benson and R.S. West Real Estate

were served shortly after the complaint was filed.

Both

Defendants filed answers, discovery was undertaken and Motions
for Summary Judgement were filed.

Defendant Sunrise Title

Corapany was not served with the Summons or Complaint.
3.

The Court dismissed part of the claims against

Defendants, Sharlene Benson and R.S. West Real Estate and then
the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the other claims.
4.

On June 22, 2000 all claims against Sharlene Benson and

R,S. West Real Estate were dismissed.

Defendant Sunrise Title

Company had not been served v/ith the Summons and Complaint.
5.

On May 17, 2001, five clays short of 11 months later,

the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, without leave of court,
which stated different causes of action than in the original
complaint.

That amended complaint with the summons were served

on Defendant, Sunrise Title Company on May 18, 2001.
6>

Defendant Sunrise Title Company responded by filing a

Motion to Dismiss based on Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the time of service.
The Court hereby grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the
summons and complaint be served within 120 days oi upon a codefendant prior to trial.

Rule 4(b) only allows service later

than the 120 days upon a co-defendant when there are issues
involving the co-defendants which are pending before the court.
In this case all co-defendants had been dismissed on June 22,
2000.

Defendant, Sunrise Title Company was not served with the

amended complaint until May IE, 2001.
Since Defendant, Sunrise Title Company was not served within
120 days alter filing of Lha complaint and was not served until
11 months after all other co-defendants were dismissed the Court
hereby ORDERS THAT:
Defendant, Sunrise Title Company is dismissed with out
prejudice.
Dated this

PJ|_ day October 2001

~~ _ M%-A. Lynn Payne
District Judge

